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Chapter  13  
Confusions and Disagreements 
about the Rotten in Politics 
Robert G. Boatright and Molly Brigid Flynn 
It is hardly original to point out that "corruption" is a word with many mean­
ings. For instance, Daniel Hays Lowenstein refers to corruption as an "essen­
tially contested concept" with no defined boundary, and Michael Johnston 
and Robert Klitgaard both suggest that the definition of corruption is neces­
sarily imprecise because what counts as corrupt varies from one culture to the 
next.1 It is almost obligatory for edited volumes on corruption to provide a 
taxonomy of different types of corruption, to differentiate between individual 
and institutional or systemic corruption, to comment on the lack of consensus 
of which particular behaviors constitute corruption, to point out that defini­
tions of corruption vary across cultures, or simply to point out that we don't 
agree on exactly what it is. Such commentary seems entirely appropriate in 
compendia of historical or social scientific research; it is good to question the 
precise definitions of the terms we use. 
Academic inquiry into corruption is linked to many other fields of study. In 
the political context, research into corruption tends to overlap with research 
into party finance, lobbying, or political advocacy. In the economic context, 
corruption research tends to overlap with studies of corporate governance, 
business management, and business/government relations. Sociological 
research into corruption often focuses upon organizational rules and proce­
dures. These studies overlap because they all address corruption as an insti­
tutional and moral problem. At the same time, however, the further away one 
gets from basic definitional questions, the more one risks losing the context 
that the history of philosophical thought about corruption provides. It is in 
such a context, we hope to show, that these various studies can be seen as 
addressing a single morally significant phenomenon in human institutions. 
Although there are different senses of corruption, these senses are related, and 
understanding these relationships should help us do three important things: 
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appreciate corruption as a perennial human problem, guard against rhetorical 
abuses of the term that are liable to agitate rather than to encourage helpful 
policy solutions, and guard against expansions of the term that might confuse 
more than they illuminate. 
The abuses and expansions of which we speak are not necessarily com­
mitted by researchers such as our fellow contributors to this volume, but by 
those who would make corruption a feature of public discussion. Those who 
do research on corruption, however, have a responsibility to guard against 
casual use of the term by others. What in this chapter we call "corruption 
talk" is often a feature of political discourse. Such talk has become more 
prominent in elite political discourse in many Western democracies over the 
past two decades despite the fact that the sorts of corrupt acts and arrange­
ments profiled in this book are not becoming more common in these same 
countries. For evidence supporting this claim, consider Figure 1. The N-gram 
here shows that references to "corrupt politicians" have steadily increased 
in the United States over the past thirty years, despite a lack of any obvious 
increase in actual corruption or an overwhelmingly newsworthy event.2 Data 
for other nations show a similar increase. In other words, there is a lot of talk 
about corruption today in public political discussions, but much of this talk 
is not about corruption in its precise political and legal meanings. 
We would propose that some of this increase in "corruption talk" is due 
to the value of the word itself as a political weapon. As such, it tends to be 
divorced from persons—to serve as a free-floating antagonist, an unmeasur-
able monster to be slain but lacking definite location. In our experience as 
observers ol American politics, we have noted the frequency of more general 
references to corruption. In the late 1990s, for instance, many proponents of 
campaign finance reform sought to reframe conventional arguments about 
limiting types of political contributions as a matter of reducing corruption.3 
igure 13.1 Figure 13.1: References to "Corrupt Politicians" in US Non-Fiction Books 
1960-2004. Source: Google Ngram. Note: This figure shows changes in the frequency 
of the term in all English-language books published in the United States over this time 
period. For explanation of the methodology, see https://books.google.com/ngrams/info. 
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More recently, left-leaning legal scholars such as Lawrence Lessig and 
Zephyr Teachout published well-received books on corruption, and conser­
vative journalists such as Jay Cost have also addressed the topic.4 In almost 
all of these instances, the corruption under investigation was said to be a 
systemic problem characterized not just by individual acts but by a larger 
decay in representative government. Our institutions are corrupt, but neither 
the people, nor necessarily the people who operate within government, are 
accused of corrupt acts. The increased use of the word indicates that we 
are more worried than we used to be about something like corruption; that 
instances of textbook corruption by people accusers are willing to name sug­
gests that we should try to figure out more clearly what exactly we are more 
worried about, when it is not, precisely, corruption. 
Such increased references are undoubtedly at least partially prompted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court's assertion in Buckley v. Va leo that "corruption, or 
the appearance of corruption" is the sole justification for restricting election-
related spending. Such references may have increased further when subse­
quent Court decisions (most notably the Citizens United v. Fe deral Election 
Commission decision) began to reject the "appearance of' half of this duo.5 
Yet the Court's language does not seem solely responsible for usage of the 
term by elites; and even if so, it does not seem to us an appropriate reason 
for changes in the meaning of the term. Furthermore, the problems afoot here 
apply to other nations as well. 
As we shall argue below, such uses of the term "corruption" are to be 
guarded against. As Laura Underkuffler has shown, allegations of corruption 
unavoidably connote judgments of character, which render it difficult to use 
in a legal context.6 We would go further, however. In most Western nations, 
there is a tradition of viewing corruption in moral or biblical terms—as a 
sort of ethical rot, or as a falling-away from the good toward evil. These 
connotations make corruption claims appealing for those seeking a dramatic 
effect. When these claims are about wrongdoing, they may effectively stig­
matize particular behaviors or persons. When they are made about political 
systems, ideologies, or even entire nations, they are conversation stoppers. 
We do not impugn the motives of those who study corruption, nor do we 
question the aspirations of those who use the term in broader political dis­
course. We do, however, wish to encourage restraint and responsibility in 
corruption talk. 
This chapter offers an overview of the history of the idea of corruption in 
classic philosophical, political, and biblical sources. The aim is to help pro­
vide a richer and older context to help us understand the increased contem­
porary discussions of political corruption. We move then to an accounting of 
the rhetorical problems inherent in the use of the term today in elite political 
discourse. We close with some brief recommendations. 
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A POLITICAL ETYMOLOGY OF CORRUPTION 
Most definitions of corruption have similar origins. There are significant 
senses of corruption that have been forgotten or marginalized in favor of the 
paradigmatic quid pro quo corrupt act. Here we survey three senses of cor­
ruption from the tradition: (1) ontological corruption, which we take to be the 
etymologically central sense from which other senses are drawn, (2) moral 
corruption, and (3) corruption of an action or agent in an institutional role. 
This survey suggests two things: first, from these senses of corruption, we 
can find good reason to talk of institutions being corruptible; second, never­
theless, this meaning does not easily fit with what those broadening the term 
name "institutional" corruption. There is individual agency in all of these 
instances, and it is nearly impossible to talk about corruption without affixing 
blame. This philosophical, moral, and biblical etymology of corruption eluci­
dates the political senses of corruption while also suggesting that we should 
be skeptical of attempts at new definitions that diverge from this background. 
Ontological Corruption 
By the ontological, we mean the study of what makes particular beings be 
what they are. The early Greek philosophers wondered about the fundamental 
material out of which things are formed: while various pre-Socratics cham­
pion earth or air or the unbounded, for example, Aristotle advocates what was 
to become for centuries the canonical view that earth, fire, air, and water are 
the four sublunary material elements. Simultaneously, he argues that these 
material elements are only potentially that thing (they are the thing's potency 
to be), while a thing's form or actuality causes these elements to cohere into a 
thing that is one and of a determinate kind. Corruption occurs, therefore, when 
the material is no longer properly integrated and actualized into the whole: 
the thing's ceasing to be is a total loss of the unifying and organizing form 
and shows up as a de-composition, a rot, spoiling, or decay (Greek phthero, 
diaphtheiro, phthoras', Hindi, bhrashtaachaar, Arabic fassad is related to 
fassouda), a destruction or dis-integration (Latin corrumpere, to break apart, 
to spoil, destroy; Hindi, vikaar). Sublunary things made of the four elements 
(in contrast to the heavenly bodies) are destructible and destined for decay: 
things fall apart, it is what they do. That is ontological corruption.7 Rotting 
(in its most literal meaning—like the rotting of a tree or an apple) provides an 
appropriate image of this etymologically basic sense of corruption. 
Two senses of ontological corruption can be distinguished: (a) diminished 
ability to function as the determinate kind of thing the thing is, and (b) full 
loss of identity as that kind of thing. A thing is made worse as the kind of 
thing it is, it becomes a less excellent instance of its kind, as its ability to 
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function as that type of thing is diminished: this is ontological corruption as 
loss of kind-specific excellence. To be corrupted in this sense is to become 
worse per se. While a thing can be partly corrupted (broken, damaged, made 
worse), complete corruption occurs when the principle of integration, iden­
tity, is lost entirely. We can still recognize, for example, broken spectacles 
as spectacles, though they are no longer functional, and at a certain point of 
loss of functionality, we would say they are no longer spectacles at all. When 
a thing completely and irreversibly loses the ability to engage in the activity 
or functioning that defines it as the type of thing it is, it loses its identity as 
that type of thing. This is corruption as destruction. Its identity has changed, 
and the name belongs to it only equivocally, derivatively according to what it 
was: what we may still call a man, for example, is really a corpse of a man. 
As Aristotle says, blind eyes are eyes only equivocally, like a statue's.8 
This ontological sense is still used, for example, when we speak of a cor­
rupt text in a manuscript or corrupt data on a computer drive. Ontological 
corruption seems to admit of degrees, where total ontological corruption 
indicates complete loss of ability to engage in the activities definitive of the 
thing. There are partial corruptions in which the substance is damaged and 
can be repaired, at least for a while: the sick sometimes regain their health, 
a damaged tool sometimes is repaired. While Seumas Miller distinguishes, 
when speaking of institutional corruption, between passive corrosion and 
agent-caused corruption, ontological corruption encompasses both the 
intransitive falling apart and the transitive being intentionally damaged.9 
This distinction will prove important, however, in making sense of institu­
tional corruption. 
Moral Corruption 
By the moral we mean the person's affective and practical orientation to 
the human good. Moral corruption occurs when an individual is no longer 
affectively and practically oriented toward the good. This seems to admit of 
degrees. When Socrates is accused of corrupting [diaphtheironta] the youth, 
moral corruption is at issue (Socrates is allegedly making the youth worse 
human beings and citizens by eroding their commitment to the civic religion). 
In Plato's Crito, Socrates discusses the loss of health that occurs when one 
disobeys a doctor or trainer as bodily corruption or destruction, and makes 
an analogy between this and the corruption that results from performing bad, 
unjust, or shameful actions and that affects "that thing" (the soul or one's 
practical judgment) by which one discerns the good and bad, just and unjust, 
noble and shameful.10 While the former, disease, seems to be a form of onto­
logical corruption causing deterioration of the body (where total corruption 
entails death), the latter is moral corruption. 
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In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes vice from incontinence 
by explaining that vice corrupts (phtheiro) knowledge of the good, that for the 
sake of which we act." Here moral corruption is explained in terms of a type 
of ontological corruption, or destruction, of an aspect of the person, namely, 
one's ability to identify the good to be accomplished through action. We 
might call someone "a complete degenerate," implying that vice is analogous 
to ontological corruption or de-generation. Put in another way, if what each 
person is, most of all is his character, his practical judgment, his reason as 
oriented toward the good, then a deterioration of this would be corruption of 
oneself, the person, in the most humanly relevant sense. Or again, if we take 
moral virtue to be the human person's characteristic excellence, what allows 
one to function well as a human person, then moral corruption is simply one 
application of ontological corruption (namely in sense (a): diminished ability 
to function as the determinate kind of thing the thing is). We can conclude 
that moral corruption is a special type of ontological corruption, namely, cor­
ruption applied to the human being as an agent. 
In addition to being likened to a rotting (the basic root-meaning of corrup­
tion), moral corruption is often also analogized to a turning or twisting. Many 
words for moral corruption in English, for example, carry the sense ultimately 
of the person erring, turning from the correct path, or the person becom­
ing twisted or crooked, for example, deviant, devious, perverted, depraved, 
warped (perhaps debauched). Moral corruption appears as a turning away 
or turning aside or a being distracted from the good. In the Allegory of the 
Cave, for example, both philosophy and ethics are portrayed as depending 
upon which way the soul turns its attention—toward the light of the Good or 
toward the lesser objects and lesser goods of the cave.12 In Aristotle, moral 
corruption likewise involves a turning of one's desires toward lesser goods, 
such as external possessions, honor, or pleasure. He describes us as like 
"sticks that are bent": to unwarp ourselves, we must bend ourselves in the 
opposite direction, away from the errors to which we are prone, and he warns 
us to be especially wary of pleasure, which we do not judge "unbribed."11 A 
partial moral corruption seems commonly human, and is understood here as a 
warping or turning, analogous to the turning of attention, affection, and alle­
giance that occurs in bribery. Loss of the species-specific ability to function 
decently as a human being involves a turning away from the human good, and 
this is what the tradition calls moral corruption. 
Corruption in the Biblical Sense 
Corruption is referred to throughout the Hebrew and Christian testaments, 
often in its ontological or moral senses. What makes the biblical treatment 
of corruption especially consequential for our purposes is the way in which 
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it links bodily ontological with moral corruption, and both of these with a 
turning away from God, that is, a rupture with God or breaking-apart of our 
covenantal relationship. In Psalm 15, the psalmist expresses a confident hope 
in redemption from worldly corruption: "thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, 
neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption [diaphthoran]." Just 
as the exile from Eden involves the curse of death, the corruptibility of the 
world and worldly goods seems linked in the biblical conception to a turning 
away from God. Human sins affect the being of the earth as a whole. In Gen­
esis 6, for example, leading up to the earth's death and rebirth in the flood, the 
earth itself is said to have been corrupted by human iniquity: "And the Lord 
God saw the earth, and it was corrupted; because all flesh had corrupted its 
way upon the earth." 
In Malachi 2, corruption is used in connection with the turning or twist­
ing of moral corruption, while also being tied to a breaking of trust and of 
corruption of one's role. "But ye [the sons of Levi as priests] have turned 
aside from the way, and caused many to fail in [following] the law: ye have 
corrupted [diephtheirate] the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord Almighty." 
Wisdom of Solomon 14 displays several senses of corruption tied together. 
Worldly objects are inherently corruptible, and idolatry is cursed because 
it calls material objects "god," in a turning away from the higher to the 
lower, in a betrayal of the object of true loyalty. Thus the ontological cor­
ruptibility of the idol is linked to a moral corruption of the idolater ("Lor 
the devising of idols was the beginning of spiritual fornication, and the 
invention of them the corruption [phthora] of life."), and the latter causes 
a general corruption of society involving a plague of evils, which are then 
enumerated. 
In Jonah, God appears as the restorer in the wake of corruption: "I went 
down into the earth, whose bars are the everlasting barriers: yet, O Lord my 
God, let my ruined [phthoras] life be restored." This theme is amplified in the 
Christian Testament, in which the world is redeemed from corruptibility and 
restored through the resurrection of the Christ. Thus, while the world is, on its 
own, corruptible and corrupted, ontologically and morally, God as redeemer 
is the means by which the corruptible take on incorruptibility, the mortal 
acquire immortality, and the immoral regain purity.14 The Christian Testament 
likewise links ontological and moral corruption in its rejection of hypocrisy: 
"Lor a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree 
bring forth good fruit."15 
This tradition appears also in theology. Thomas Aquinas follows other 
Christian theologians in blaming the original sin for two forms of corruption 
endemic to human life: moral corruption (the disordering of the powers of the 
soul) as being the new normal in our fallen state, and bodily corruption (our 
susceptibility to sickness and death): 
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In this [incidental] way the sin of our first parent [Adam] is the cause of death and 
all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent orig­
inal justice was taken awa y, whereby not only were the lower powers o f the soul 
held together unde r the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also 
the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect,. 
. . Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; 
just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers 
..., so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the bo dy.16 
Underkufiler's account suggests that the connotations of corruption involve 
a person being captured by evil in a way that becomes manifest in corrupt 
actions when the agent is given power. This, furthermore, ruins the person's 
character and, unless controlled, ruins the person's actions and the trustwor­
thiness of the institution within which the person acts. These connotations are 
illuminated by the roots of the concept in classical treatments of corruption 
as ruin and moral decay, but Underkuffler's account makes the most sense in 
light of the biblical conception. For in the biblical tradition, corruption does 
not describe merely occasional, particular actions but also an evil state of 
the human soul that infects other humans and wreaks havoc for our entirely 
earthly existence. Underkuffler agrees that this conception of corruption is 
not a proper legal category. Still, it forms part of the deeper context of our 
accusations of corruption. 
Corruption of an Institutional Action or Agent 
In Republic I, Thrasymachus wished to maintain that justice (which is the 
goal of the ruler) really amounts to the interests of the stronger (the ruler 
himself).17 This obtains, according to Socrates and Thrasymachus' developed 
argument of book I, not for the ruler "in the precise sense," that is, insofar as 
he is a ruler, but only for the ruling person who fails to be at that moment what 
the name "ruler" requires. An analogous conclusion is applied by Socrates to 
doctors, for example, who are not as such money-makers. The distinction they 
are drawing—between the role holder as such and the person who happens to 
hold the role—is a crucial one for understanding the popular meaning of cor­
ruption, corruption of or by someone holding an office. In Miller's account, 
for example, "we can conclude that acts of institutional corruption necessar­
ily involve a corruptor who performs the corrupt action qua occupant of an 
institutional role and/or someone who is corrupted qua occupant of an insti­
tutional role."18 Miller focuses on this most common sense of corruption, "the 
corruption of persons in so far as they are occupants of institutional roles."19 
We refer here to corruption of an institutional agent qua institutional agent 
as role holder corruption. Role-holder corruption occurs in the context of an 
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institution in which the role is held. As a role holder in an institution, a person 
under a certain aspect takes on institutional purposes; he is supposed to serve 
these goods in the way defined by his specific role. An institutional purpose 
must be distinguished from purposes sought by the role holders not qua role 
holders. For example, making a living may be a goal of the particular judge, 
motivating his employment, but allowing the judge to make a living is not an 
institutional purpose of the criminal justice system and is not a purpose of the 
judge qua judge. 
There are many ways to describe subcategories of role holder corruption. 
For instance, we can here distinguish between, on the one hand, (3a) cor­
rupt actions undertaken by a role holder in exercising his role, which we call 
role-exercise corruption, and, on the other hand, (3b) role holder corruption, 
which is dispositional and displays itself in such actions. In (3b), the role 
holder's character as role holder is corrupt. In (3a), role-exercise corruption, 
the particular actions of a role holder as role holder are corrupt. Namely, 
these are actions in which he uses his role corruptly: in such actions the role 
holder exercises the powers of his role for the sake of other purposes rather 
than for those purposes definitive of his role. It is here, as well, that we might 
include corrupt practices: when role holder corruption grows common, it can 
become accepted and the norms about what the roles entail may be forgotten 
or corrupted. 
Role-holder corruption involves the agent's diminished ability to function 
as the kind of thing he is as holding that role—as a policeman, doctor, judge, 
etc. Role-holder corruption is a type of ontological corruption, namely, cor­
ruption applied to the human being as a particular role holder. Yet to accuse 
a role holder of being corrupt or engaging in corrupt actions means more 
than this—for there are many possible causes other than "corruption" of this 
diminished ability (e.g., sickness, natural disasters, incompetence). What 
we mean by corruption in the context of institutional role holders involves 
also a disposition to role-exercise corruption—acts in which the role holder 
exercises the powers of his role for goods other than the fulfillment of his 
role. Role-holder and role-exercise corruption share with moral corruption a 
turning or twisting or erring away by the agent from his proper ends. Thus, 
like corruption in the biblical sense, role holder and role-exercise corruption 
blend the ontological corruption and moral senses of corruption, above. The 
holder of a role in a blameworthy way fails to fulfill the duties prescribed 
by his role, thereby decaying or destroying his substance as fulfiller of that 
role. He doesn't do his job. Rather, he is, while holding the role and using the 
appearance of his role, up to something else. Although he does not discuss 
ontological corruption, Miller does invoke the concept in connection with role 
holder corruption: 
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If the process [of corruption] proceeds far enough, then we no longer have a 
corrupt official or corruption of a n institutional process or institution; we cease 
to have a person who can be properly described as, say, a judge.... Like a coin 
that has been bent and defaced beyond recognition, it is no longer a coin.20 
To use Socrates' example again, a doctor possesses certain duties and pre­
rogatives as a role holder in the medical profession. He may corrupt his role 
as doctor were he to encourage a patient to adopt a medication not because it 
is the best treatment for the patient's condition but because the manufactur­
ing company provides him kickbacks or is owned by his cousin. He is not, as 
he does so, acting like a "real" doctor; he is not fulfilling the characteristic 
excellence as a doctor. Likewise, someone may fake friendship with another 
person because the other person is useful to him. When discussing friend­
ships, Aristotle comments, a person 
might complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasant­
ness, he pretended to love us for our character. For . . . when [the person] has 
been deceived by the pretenses of the other person, it is just that he should 
complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does 
against people who counterfeit the currency, in asmuch as the wrongdoing is 
concerned with something more valuable.21 
The counterfeiting analogy seems apt. Role-exercise corruption involves 
not only a blameworthy failure to do one's job, but something fraudulent: a 
leveraging of the prerogatives of one's job or role for the sake of something 
else. This connects role-exercise and role holder corruption clearly to onto-
logical and moral corruption: in a corrupt institutional action, the role holder 
is something of a counterfeiter. Thus Dante classifies graft as a type of fraud." 
Office holders guilty of barratry (he does not use the word for corruption) boil 
in sticky, black pitch. One of the damned offers a deal to the devils continu­
ally forcing him beneath the pitch, and—true to his vice—he betrays the trust 
and uses the opportunity to run away. 
Another subtype of (3a) is what we call transactional corruption. Trans­
actional corruption occurs within an institution in which a role is held and 
requires that the agent, in a way that misuses his role, exchange with some­
one else an exercise of his role's prerogatives for something else. Aristotle 
describes the Spartan office of the Ephors, for example, as susceptible to this 
type of corruption, and he connects role holder corruption with destruction or 
ruin (ontological corruption) of the institution: "for certain Ephors were cor­
rupted [diaphtharentes] with money and so far as lay in their power ruined the 
whole state."23 Exceptional circumstances aside (perhaps cases of coercion), 
by participating in an action that is transactionally corrupt, the role holder 
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incidentally corrupts also himself as a role holder.24 Transactional corruption, 
if it is dispositional, is the paradigmatic form of role holder corruption, and 
often a single instance of it is taken as indicative of the overall character of 
the agent as a role holder: it seems he cannot be trusted. Instead of fulfilling 
the duties of his role, to which he has a prima facie moral duty, the role holder 
has twisted himself, turned his concern to other goods; he is simply up to 
something other than fulfilling his role, thus falsifying or destroying, as far as 
that one action is concerned, his substance as the holder of that role. There­
fore, transactional corruption is a type of corruption in sense (3), corruption 
of an institutional action or agent, and is essentially related to senses (1) and 
(2), ontological and moral corruption. Like corruption in the biblical sense, 
which also blends these two more basic senses, the connotation of corruption 
of institutional actions and agents is that moral failings carry in their wake a 
susceptibility to temptation and a corrosion of the world that surrounds us. 
In the modern tradition of political thought, corruption is discussed often, 
and in ways that fit into these senses. Often officeholders are said to be cor­
rupt, and various suggestions are made to avoid such corruption. Many think­
ers also discuss what happens when the people themselves are corrupt, either 
morally corrupt or in their capacity as governable by the laws of the type of 
regime. Montesquieu, for instance, claims that a constitution or regime is 
corrupt when it turns away from its principles, and this can happen in various 
ways.25 Sometimes the discussion is clearly ontological—regimes become 
sick and degenerate, as in Hobbes' Leviathan.16 Sometimes, as in Machia-
velli's Discourses, it is clearly moral, especially when corruption of a people 
is concerned.27 Sometimes it is role holder corruption or transactional, as in 
Rousseau's On the Social Contract, where he discusses the "turning" that 
takes place when the public interest is lost or ignored by those who govern.28 
Because political theorists disagree about the best types of regime, about what 
constitutes the proper purpose of government, these concepts take on differ­
ent features for different thinkers. 
It has been argued that the meaning of corruption changed during the 
eighteenth century, shedding some of its moral overtones and adopting a more 
political/economic cast.29 This may be so, but during this era and beyond 
corruption has not lost its connection to persons, to character. Overall, politi­
cally relevant corruption—whether of an institution, a regime, a people, or an 
officeholder—is grounded in the corruption of the persons ruling or the people 
being ruled. In other words, the major philosophical points of reference for 
contemporary authors discuss corruption in different contexts, particularly in 
relation to the modern state with its new conception of the proper nature and 
purpose of government, but they do not present a definition of corruption that 
is at odds with those we have discussed above.10 None, with the partial excep­
tion of Montesquieu, characterize corruption as an institutional phenomenon 
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floating free from failures of persons.31 As the early modern project involves, 
in part, the establishment of institutions that derive power from the consent 
or involvement of the governed, it seems odd to draw from them a theory of 
institutional corruption that does not implicate individuals. 
IMPLICATIONS 
These basic, traditional senses of corruption suggest two questions: Where do 
contemporary discussions of corruption fit in, and why has such discussion 
increased? 
Let us begin with three observations regarding the question of fit. First, 
note that common instances of individual corruption such as bribery and 
extortion fit in neatly as instances of role-exercise corruption. The survey has 
illuminated why we call them corrupt, while also showing that they are not 
the conceptually primary senses of corruption. It is only in the context of mis­
using a role, with its prerogatives and duties, that a quid pro quo is corrupt, 
connecting to ontological and moral corruption. (After all, we all engage in 
non-corrupt quid pro quo exchanges on a regular basis—e.g., milk for money) 
Second, note that transactional corruption by no means has a monopoly on 
legitimate meanings of corruption. The concept is simply broader. And, third, 
we can also see easily how one might speak of institutional corruption apart 
from transactional corruption. An institution might suffer from ontological 
corruption—a diminution of its ability to function according to the type of 
human instrument it is, or perhaps such complete loss of functionality that 
it ceases to be what it was. Yet this mere ontological sense is not generally 
what contemporary authors mean by "institutional corruption," for institu­
tional corrosion should be distinguished from institutional corruption.32 The 
connotations of the latter require sense (3), role holder and role-exercise cor­
ruption. This corruption is not limited merely to transactional, quid pro quos; 
yet they involve human agents as role holders being corrupted as role holders 
and engaging in corrupt exercises of their roles. To speak of institutional cor­
ruption implies, at a minimum, that our institutions facilitate transactional or 
role-exercise corruption even if we have chosen not to single out instances of 
such corruption. 
This survey suggests that institutional corruption really involves the corrupt 
actions of individual role holders rather than something more free-floating. 
Dennis Thompson's definition of institutional corruption seems to fit here—it 
is one way, apart from quid pro quos,, in which an agent is turned from his 
proper ends as a role holder.33 However, any definition of political corruption 
that implicates institutions and not individuals fits only in sense (la), as a 
type of diminished functioning of the institution. A corrupt institution, in this 
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sense, is merely one that is worse, that is falling apart, that is not functioning 
well. Yet, in political contexts, we should be wary of calling corrupt any insti­
tution we deem to function deficiently. Such a definition of institutional cor­
ruption makes institutional corruption "corruption" only in the most generic, 
apolitical ontological sense, failing to distinguish between institutional cor­
rosion and institutional corruption. This is the cost of using the rhetoric ol 
corruption while not wanting to implicate role holders in corruptions of their 
roles. Consider, however, an imprudent counselor to a senator: insofar as his 
bad advice influences the senator, and insofar as his senator carries influence 
in the senate, his influence weakens the effectiveness of the institution.'4 This 
is not corruption in the morally or institutionally relevant senses on which 
contemporary claims or theories play rhetorically. 
Even though it is not hard to understand the intentions behind much con­
temporary "corruption talk," that meaning is, as we have shown, somewhat 
removed from both today's colloquial meaning and the way the word has 
been used in classic works. In most definitions of corruption, there is a broad 
agreement that corruption shows a turning away of the agent from his proper 
ends or function toward more selfish goods (e.g., money, power, honor), or 
toward a partial interest rather than a common good. This general framework 
can encompass a wide variety of actions, but ultimately it is not the action 
itself that is of principal concern. Rather, the corrupt act is taken as a symp­
tom of the corruption of the person. An inward truth about the agent has 
pierced through his public show: the particular act of turning away indicates a 
condition, an established character, consisting in the agent's perhaps habitual 
orientation toward these other interests, proving the agent a false or at least 
undependable servant of his proper ends. It is the process of turning away 
behind the particular action that is of consequence. 
Now let us turn to considering the contemporary increase in corruption 
talk. We argued above that part of this increase is due to the usefulness of 
the term as a political weapon. Our political etymology of the word helps us 
understand why rhetorically it is so useful. Namely, the word carries emotion­
ally powerful connotations that extend beyond its more narrow, transactional 
sense. The word has a background that connotes not just decay and decline, 
but a decay and decline whose source is evil, a turning away from the good. 
The biblical background in particular provides helpful context, because it 
mixes the ontological and moral sense of the word in a cosmically significant 
claim. It is by turning away from the good that people are morally corrupted, 
and this is not merely a matter of isolated actions or even of a problem of 
character, but a problem of an evil that infects the whole world. In the biblical 
tradition,'and in the Christian theology that follows it, this moral corruption 
destabilizes the entire natural order. Likewise, we have a strong sense that 
corruption destabilizes the entire social and political order. The users of the 
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word may not explicitly intend to invoke these connotations, just as they tend 
not to accuse any identifiable and prosecutable persons of corruption in the 
colloquial sense; still, this is the deep background, the powerful cultural and 
emotional connotations of the word in the tradition.35 These connotations 
make it a natural choice for political rhetoric that aims to describe a large-
scale decline and destabilization in our social order, a turning away by some 
(even if we cannot name them or describe their discrete actions) from the 
common good. 
We contend also that this increase in corruption talk, given that it is not 
about corruption in the more narrow, colloquial sense, is actually about 
something else, something like corruption in this narrower sense, but harder 
to name. It is, furthermore, a word that resonates, which suggests that it 
describes a real phenomenon, a phenomenon that can be analogized to civi-
lizational decay and moral rot. Many people in Western democracies must 
feel like there is something afoot, and corruption is a close enough word that 
it makes some sense to use it. The word taps into a common worry. What is 
this common worry? 
Corruption carries important symbolic weight in any democracy, because 
it seems to be a violation of the principle of rule by the people and for the 
people. In standard transactional corruption, the official seems no longer to 
be acting as a representative but freelancing, stifling rule by the people, and 
the person or interest served is not that part of the common good for the sake 
of which his office has been assigned, but something or someone else, stifling 
rule for the people. This symbolic weight of transactional corruption, per­
haps, allows the word to be used loosely to express concern about the health 
of government "by the people and for the people." Political punditry of the 
1970s was replete with discussions of "malaise," and political scientists in 
subsequent years wrote extensively about a "democratic deficit." It has been 
well documented that citizens of Western democracies have been steadily 
losing faith in democratic institutions for nearly half a century now.16 If one 
wishes to capture anger over this decline, it seems clear to us that "corrup­
tion" is a much more dramatic term to use than its competitors. No one would 
readily enlist in a battle to fight malaise or a democratic deficit. 
The corruption people are worried about, then, is related to a sense that 
our democratic institutions are not adequately acting as representatives of 
the people or securing the common good as well as they should or did. It is 
important to note that people can have such a feeling even if it is false: public 
perceptions can be manipulated, or distorted unintentionally, in many ways, 
and decline narratives are easy to believe. The problems of today easily 
seem more common than in the past. Because we don't directly experience 
the past, we might easily construct illusory golden ages from which we have 
fallen. 
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Still, some problems sometimes do get worse. Not all decline narratives are 
false. Perhaps today's democracies are less adequate than they once were at 
representing the citizenry or at securing the blessings (or at minimizing the 
troubles) of liberty—there is certainly ample literature on American politics 
to support such claims. But this allegation can be true even when particular 
agents are not guilty of transactional corruption or even of turning away from 
the good. For example, the adequacy of a government being "by and for" the 
people can be undermined by the sheer size of our political communities and 
by the administrative organizations that try to manage them. If citizens feel 
like their democratic institutions are corroding, becoming less democratic, it 
is natural to look for people to blame, to look not just for corrosion but for 
corruption: to look for agency and not merely incompetence or accident. The 
word "corruption" taps into this. It has long been an effective political tool 
to rally citizens against a nameless, faceless "other" causing their problems. 
We might call such people "the funders" (as Lessig does) or "Washington" or 
"the one percent," or we might coin other amusing names to imply that there 
are nefarious and possibly evil forces at work.'7 It is harder, and perhaps less 
satisfying, to blame ourselves or our rules and procedures. 
RHETORICAL PROBLEMS 
Perhaps we are holding those who allege institutional corruption to too high 
a standard, when what they prefer to do is not to philosophize but to galva­
nize, to use the term as a rhetorical tactic. Language changes over time, and 
as shown above, the meaning of the term "corruption' has also developed. It 
is beyond our means here to address the question of why language changes 
(whether naturally or through deliberate decisions by individuals), but we do 
not mean to suggest that one cannot redefine a term.78 We mean, instead, to 
note that if this is the task, it should be owned up to, and the reason for that 
task—the end—should also be specified. 
This returns us to our initial concern; if institutional corruption arguments 
fail as philosophy, perhaps they succeed as rhetoric. The immediate political 
goals of this rhetoric are not hard to identify, nor are they goals that we find 
particularly objectionable. It seems like a good idea for us at least to be open 
to larger arguments about our political system and the other institutions that 
dominate our lives. The question is not whether we should have a serious 
discussion about reform, but rather what sort of frame we should use in that 
discussion. In addition to its conceptual problems, however, we also find the 
"corruption" frame to be rhetorically problematic. This is so for three reasons. 
First, there is the problem of scale. It is difficult to claim that being "a 
little bit corrupt" is a sustainable equilibrium (a point Underkuffler makes 
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repeatedly). It is also difficult to sustain the individual vs. institutional 
dichotomy; even if we know what the articulators of institutional corruption 
theories want to say, they're still not actually saying it; we bring the prior con­
notations of corruption to the table. These two problems make allegations of 
corruption problematic as an invitation to discourse. One cannot expect either 
an individual who has been said to be corrupt or a participant in an allegedly 
corrupt institution to be an eager and open partner in a sincere discussion 
of alternatives. Were it possible to forge bipartisan unity around the notion 
that there is corruption out there, not attached to individuals, that might be a 
plausible venture. But the connotations of the word and our tendency to attach 
corruption to individuals effectively precludes that. 
Second, corruption talk can become contagious. We have argued that claims 
about corruption succeed only if there is a reference point—an example, real 
or symbolic—of an uncorrupted actin, officeholder, or institution. If there 
is no such shared starting point, then those making claims about corruption 
effectively talk past each other, and the word becomes just another partisan 
accusation. In his earlier work on the U.S. Congress, Thompson recognized 
this.39 He describes the manner in which corruption allegations became a 
political tool in the waning days of the Democratic Party's forty-year long 
rule in the House of Representatives. Both sides, he argues, took part in a 
"cycle of accusation" in which each accused the other of corruption. As a 
result of this, he claims, the charges lost their moral authority, and it became 
difficult to separate individual from institutional corruption and major ethical 
violations from minor ones. It is easy to see this taking place now, outside of 
Congress. A big theory of corruption, especially one that seems to implicate 
all of us, can make identifying the egregious cases difficult, and can force 
everyone to choose sides. One might argue that talking about corruption can, 
in limited doses, be helpful. As Bruce Cain writes, allegations of corruption 
can be an effective deterrent, even if they are unproven.40 Political candidates 
may shy away from questionable activities not because they fear legal sanc­
tion but because just being accused of being corrupt may harm them. Corrup­
tion, as we have seen, is that powerful of a concept. But if everyone is calling 
everyone else corrupt, the charge may be less effective. 
Third, as we have shown in our survey of philosophical treatments of cor­
ruption, when taken away from the individual context, claims about corruption 
become "epic" in nature. One line of thought holds that corruption is a virtu­
ally unstoppable process. This may or may not be true. It is, however, a pro­
cess that seems much larger than day-to-day politics. Many of the "solutions" 
that tend to be proposed, however, seem rather small in nature. If, for instance, 
our institutions are indeed corrupt, why would tinkering with campaign con­
tribution limits redeem them? If we truly have a theory of institutional cor­
ruption, then the dramatic solutions should be embraced. We do not endorse 
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this idea, but it seems like the logical conclusion from the larger theories. If 
we have something smaller, more manageable, perhaps we can be more polite 
and talk about changing the mechanics.41 But it seems hard to advocate both. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contemporary corruption talk thus seems ill-suited to express our actual con­
temporary political concerns. The rhetorical problems we have raised suggest, 
we would argue, that contemporary corruption talk bears little relationship to 
corruption research, and that furthermore it runs the risk of distracting us both 
from more pressing political conversations and from more overt instances of 
individual corruption. We would argue that those who study political corrup­
tion have a responsibility to address this gap. 
In making this claim, we do not wish to diminish the value of empirical 
or conceptual studies of corruption, nor do we wish to discourage would-be 
reformers from talking about the (very real) ills that we see in contemporary 
politics. Despite the problems we have always had in defining it, the concept 
of corruption has a long and rich history. There are, in addition, many simi­
larly useful terms and frames that have been presented in looking at the role 
of money and self-interest in politics. Corrosion, distortion, influence, and 
other terms have been used without the pretense that a grand theory is being 
developed. There is no reason to drop such terms in favor of "corruption." To 
close with a brief recommendation, let us consider a recent newspaper edito­
rial on money in U.S. politics by Nicholas Kristof.42 There, Kristof recites 
many of the familiar yet troubling features of contemporary election politics, 
variously describing it as "polluted," "egregious," "perverse incentives from 
a rotten structure," "sad," and "institutionalized sleaze." But not corrup­
tion.43 It is a strongly worded article that raises points about individuals and 
institutions without stepping into the conceptual morass we have outlined in 
this paper. Whether one agrees with the sentiments here or not, whether the 
language chosen in them was adopted with the same concerns in mind that 
we have, it shows that we can have a heated discussion about politics and our 
public purpose more broadly without distorting—some might say corrupt­
ing—our language for political gain. 
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